Unitary Taxation and International Tax Rules by Avi-Yonah, Reuven S.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Law & Economics Working Papers 
1-1-2013 
Unitary Taxation and International Tax Rules 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current 
 Part of the Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Working Paper Citation 
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., "Unitary Taxation and International Tax Rules" (2013). Law & Economics Working 
Papers. 83. 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351920 
DRAFT 11/7/13 
 
Unitary Taxation and International Tax Rules  
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 
Zachee Pouga Tinhaga2 
 
 
Any proposal to adopt Unitary Taxation (UT) of multinationals has to 
contend with whether such taxation is compatible with existing 
international tax rules and in particular with the bilateral tax treaty 
network. Indeed, some researchers have argued that the separate 
accounting (SA) method and the arm’s length standard are so 
embodied in the treaties that they form part of customary international 
law and are binding even in the absence of a treaty. In this paper we 
will argue that UT can be compatible with most of the existing tax 
treaties, and that developing countries in particular can implement it 
in most cases with or without a tax treaty. 
 
1. UT and the Existing Treaty Network.  
 
                                                 
1 Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan 
2 LLM in International Tax, the University of Michigan (2013). 
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Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, 
which assumes the SA method because it addresses the commercial or 
financial relations between associated enterprises.3 If UT were 
adopted, Article 9 would become irrelevant in those situations to 
which UT applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist) 
because UT ignores the transactions between related parties, and 
treats them instead as part of a single enterprise. 
 
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), 
“[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State 
controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the other 
Contracting State … shall not of itself constitute either company a 
permanent establishment of the other.” However, it is well established 
that a dependent agent can be a permanent establishment (see Art. 
5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent is based on whether the 
principal exercises legal and economic control over the agent.4 “An 
                                                 
3 The quoted articles are identical in all the tax treaty models except when discussed in the text. 
4 See, e.g., Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd v. Administracion General del Estado, Case No. STS/202/2012 (Spanish 
Supreme Court Jan. 12, 2012)  (Swiss principal had PE in Spain through an affiliated Spanish company; activity of 
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agent that is subject to detailed instructions regarding the conduct of 
its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is not 
legally independent.”5 
 
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary 
business, a strong argument can be made in most cases that the parent 
of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control over the 
operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries bear 
no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services exclusively or near 
exclusively from the parent or other related corporations. The 
existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in most important 
operational decisions being centralized. In that case, the subsidiaries 
should be regarded as dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding 
                                                                                                                                                             
the subsidiary was directed organized and managed in a detailed manner by the principal); Salad Dressing, Fiscal 
Court Baden-Wurttemberg, 3 K 54/93, Internationales Steuerrecht 1997 (Swiss principal had a PE at the premises of 
an unrelated German contract manufacturer based on detailed instruction by principal); Milcal Media Limited, Court 
of Appeal, Stockholm, Case nos. 7453-54-02 (2005) (Cyprus principal had a PE through Swedish subsidiary 
because it was subject to detailed instructions and control); eFunds Corp. v. ADIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 
Delhi, 2010; Lucent Technologies v. DCIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 2008 (US parent company had a 
service PE in India); and the cases cited by LeGall, infra.  
5 U.S. Treasury. Technical Explanation of United States Model Income Tax Convention. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, Art. 5(6) (2006).  
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is in fact made with increasing frequency in both developed and 
developing countries.6 
  
If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the treaties 
requires the attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary “that it 
might be expected to make if it were a distinct and independent 
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or 
similar conditions.”  Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this 
arm’s length condition because in the absence of precise comparables 
(which almost never exist) it is not possible to determine exactly what 
profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.  
 
When the US adopted CPM and profit split in the 1994 transfer 
pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the 
treaties because these methods did not rely on exact comparables to 
                                                 
6 Le Gall JP. (2007) The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Can a Subsidiary Be a Permanent 
Establishment of its Foreign Parent? Commentary on Article 5, par. 7 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention. Tax Law Review 60: 179-214. 
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find the arm’s length price. However, these objections soon subsided, 
and even the OECD endorsed similar methods in its transfer pricing 
guidelines. The US has always maintained that both CPM and profit 
split satisfy the arm’s length standard despite the lack of precise 
comparables (and in the case of profit split, using no comparables at 
all to allocate any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained 
that the “super-royalty rule” of IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties 
to be “commensurate with the income” from an intangible, and 
therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s 
length standard, even though no comparables can be found to show 
that such adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties. 
 
Before the recent changes to the OECD MC, it was therefore quite 
plausible to argue that UT was compatible with the treaties if the 
subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or economically dependent 
on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country that 
wished to adopt UT could rely on the language of the OECD MC Art. 
7(4): 
5
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 “Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to 
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment 
on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the 
enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by 
such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of 
apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall 
be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article.” 
 
Since it can be argued that in the absence of comparables the result 
reached under UT is equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this 
language seems to permit the use of UT for dependent agent PEs.  
      
However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to article 7 that may    
make this argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the OECD 
has adopted the “authorized OECD approach” to the attribution of 
profits to PE that treats them as the equivalent to subsidiaries, and has 
6
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suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject UT 
should be applied to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the US 
lead and deleted article 7(4) from its MC. However, the UN model still 
includes article 7(4). 
 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of existing actual treaties have not been 
revised to incorporate those changes. In particular, Appendix A shows 
that many developing country treaties contain article 7(4), even when the 
treaties are with OECD members. The Appendix lists 174 such treaties 
by developing countries that contain this language, including recent 
treaties such as India-Lithuania (2011) India-Nepal (2011) Korea-
Panama (2010) and treaties with OECD members such as India-Sweden, 
India-UK, Mexico-UK, and Sri Lanka-US.  In all of those cases, 
countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the 
analysis set out above.  
 
Nor does the argument from customary international law impede such 
effort. The argument is based on the contention that because SA and the 
7
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ALS are embodied in all of the treaties they should be considered 
binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not enough to create a 
customary international law ban on UT, since article 7(4) is embodied as 
well. The key issue is what countries actually do, and many of them 
follow UT approaches in practice. In addition, in this case countries 
should be free to follow the UN Model which does not adopt the 
changes made by the OECD, and which is also widely followed. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its 
approach. The authorized OECD approach may have marked the high 
point of OECD commitment to SA. With the beginning of the BEPS 
project, which is influenced by large developing countries like China 
and India, it is likely that the OECD may be stepping back from its total 
commitment to SA.  Specifically, the potential adoption under BEPS of 
country by country reporting (which is already required for extractive 
industries in the US) can be the basis for implementation of UT. 
 
2. UT and Developing Countries  
8
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 What can a developing country do to implement UT? If there is no 
treaty, or if the treaty contains Art. 7(4) type language, the biggest 
obstacle to implementation may be obtaining the information needed 
to apply UT.  
  
The recent redraft of the UN Transfer Pricing Manual recommends that 
among the documentation which a tax administration should request for 
a Transfer Pricing audit should be the “Group global consolidated basis 
profit and loss statement and ratio of taxpayer's sales towards group 
global sales for five years'” (para. 8.6.9.12). This provides a good basis 
for application of UT. The rejection of UT in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines is based on its definition of FA as `applying a formula fixed 
in advance'. This leaves considerable scope for adoption of UT 
approaches with ad hoc formulas, which are not based on a fixed 
formula. 
Specifically, as discussed in Michael Durst’s work, allocation 
according to operating expenses would be clearer and easier to 
9
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administer, and most importantly would fit within the current rules of 
international tax. We have argued that in the context of the profit split 
method, the residual profit cannot be allocated on the basis of 
comparables and therefore can be allocated based on operating expenses 
without deviating from the ALS.  This would entail first assigning to 
each country an estimated market return on the tax deductible expenses 
incurred by the multinational group in that country. 
Developing countries should therefore be encouraged to draft their 
transfer pricing laws to include powers to adjust the accounts of any 
foreign-owned local company or branch, if the Revenue Authority 
considers that its accounts do not fairly reflect the profits earned locally, 
to bring the taxable profits into line with those which such a business 
would be expected to earn, having regard to (a) similar businesses either 
in that country or elsewhere, and/or (b) the relationship of the local 
business to the worldwide activities of the corporate group of which it is 
a part. This would involve analysis and comparison of provisions in the 
tax laws of appropriate countries. 
10
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 The transition from SA to UT is likely to be a long process, and it 
may require ultimately renegotiating the treaties or even drafting a 
multilateral treaty like the EU’s CCCTB. However, a good beginning 
can be made now by exploring how developing countries can adopt UT 
principles within the context of the existing treaty network. This paper 
has tried to show that such approaches are quite feasible because most 
developing countries are not bound by the authorized OECD approach to 
article 7, and because even the OECD may be reconsidering its approach 
in the context of the BEPS project. 
  
11
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Appendix A 
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CONTRACTING 
STATES DATE 
ADOPTED VERSION OF ARTICLE 7: 
7-4 LANGUAGE 
INDIA &   
Japan March 7, 1989 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
New Zealand Oct. 17, 1986
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Singapore Jan. 24, 1994 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Israel Jan. 26, 1996 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Kuwait June 15, 2006 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Lithuania July 26, 2011
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Luxemburg June 2, 2008 
Art. 32 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Mexico Sept. 10, 2007 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
13
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Mozambique Sept. 30, 2010 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Myanmar April 2, 2008
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Namibia Feb. 15, 1997 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Nepal Nov. 27, 2011 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Norway Dec. 31, 1986 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Oman April 2, 1997
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Philippines Feb. 12, 1990 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Taiwan July 12, 2011
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
14
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 83 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
Feb. 8, 2006 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Sri Lanka Jan. 27, 1982 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Sweden June 7, 1988 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Syria June 18, 2008 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Tajikistan Nov. 20, 2008 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Tanzania May 27, 2011 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Thailand Mar. 22, 1985 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Kingdom Jan. 25, 1993 
Art. 30 
“…nothing in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article shall 
preclude that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be 
necessary …” 
15
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Ukraine April 7, 1999
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam Sept. 7, 1994 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
INDONESIA &   
Netherlands Mar. 5, 1973 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Switzerland Aug. 29, 1988 
Art. 25 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Iran April 30, 2004 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Japan Mar. 3, 1982 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Kuwait April 23, 1997 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Mauritius Dec. 10, 1996 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
16
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Mexico Sept. 6, 2002 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Korea July 11, 2002
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
New Zealand Mar. 25, 1987 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Philippines June 18, 1981 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Poland Oct. 6, 1992 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Portugal July 9, 2003 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Slovakia Oct. 12, 2000
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Syria June 7, 1997 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
17
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Thailand Mar. 25, 1981 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Tunisia May 13, 1992 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Nov. 30, 
1995 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Kingdom April 5, 1993
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Ukraine April 11, 1996 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Venezuela Feb. 27, 1997 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam Dec. 22, 1997 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Zimbabwe May 30, 2001 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
KOREA &   
18
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Syria Feb. 21, 2000 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Mexico Oct. 16, 1994
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Malta Mar. 25, 1997 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Romania Oct. 11, 1993
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Sri Lanka May 28, 1984 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Switzerland Feb. 12, 1980 
Art. 26 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Tunisia Sept. 27, 1988 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Ukraine Sept. 29, 1999 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
19
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Russia Sept. 26, 1997 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Myanmar Feb. 22, 2002 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Oman Sept. 23, 2005 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Panama Oct. 20, 2010
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Slovakia Aug. 27, 2001 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Slovenia April 25, 2005 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Thailand Nov. 16, 2006 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Sept. 23, 
2003 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
20
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Venezuela June 26, 2006 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
MEXICO &   
Netherlands Sept. 27, 1993 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Singapore Nov. 9, 1994 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Switzerland Aug. 3, 1993 
Art. 26 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Kingdom June 2, 1994 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Norway Mar. 23, 1995 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Poland Nov. 30, 1998 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Portugal  Nov. 11, 1999 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
21
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Romania July 20, 2000
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Russia June 7, 2004 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Slovakia May 13, 2006 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Spain July 24, 1992
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Sweden Sept. 21, 1992 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Ukraine Jan. 23, 2012 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Venezuela Feb. 6, 1997 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
MOROCCO &   
Pakistan May 18, 2006 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
22
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 83 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83
Poland Oct. 24, 1994
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Portugal Sept. 29, 1997 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Romania Sept. 11, 1981 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Singapore Jan. 9, 2007 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
Switzerland Mar. 31, 1993 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Ukraine July 13, 2007
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
NETHERLANDS&   
Norway Nov. 13, 1989 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
New Zealand Oct. 15, 1980
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
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South Africa Mar. 15, 1971 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Slovakia Mar. 4, 1974 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Venezuela May 29, 1991 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Oman Oct. 5, 2009 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Pakistan Mar. 24, 1982 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Panama Oct. 6, 2010 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Poland Sept. 20, 1979 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Portugal Sept. 20, 1999 
Art. 32 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
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Qatar April 24, 2008 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Taiwan Feb. 27, 2001 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Romania Mar.5, 1998 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Saudi Arabia Oct. 13, 2008
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Slovenia June 30, 2004 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Sri Lanka Nov. 17, 1982 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Arab 
Emirates 
May 8, 2007 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Uganda Aug. 31, 2004 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
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Venezuela May 29, 1991 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam Jan. 24, 1995 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Zambia Dec. 19, 1977 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Zimbabwe May 18, 1989 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
PHILIPPINES&   
Poland Sept. 9, 1992 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Qatar Dec. 14, 2008 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
Romania May 18, 1994 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Russia April 26, 1995 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
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Singapore Aug.1, 1997 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
ROMANIA&   
San Marino May 23, 2007 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Switzerland Oct. 25, 1993
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
Qatar Oct. 24, 1999
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Yugoslavia May 16, 1996 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Russia Sept. 27, 1993 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
RUSSIA&   
Switzerland Nov. 15, 1995 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Yugoslavia Oct. 12, 1995
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
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Slovenia Nov. 29, 1995 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Sri Lanka Mar. 2, 1999 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Syria Sept. 17, 2000 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Thailand Sept. 23, 1999 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Venezuela Sept. 22, 2003 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam May 27, 1993 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
SAUDI ARABIA&   
Ukraine Sept. 2, 2011 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam April 10, 2010 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
SERBIA &   
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Slovenia June 11, 2003 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Spain Mar. 9, 2009 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Turkey Oct. 12, 2005
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Jan 13, 2013 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
SOUTH AFRICA&   
Switzerland July 3, 1967 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Ukraine Aug. 28, 2003 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
SRI LANKA &   
United Kingdom June 21, 1979 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United States 
Mar. 14, 
1985 
As amended 
by 2002 
protocol 
Although this paragraph is not included in the U.S. Model, this is not a substantive 
difference because the result provided by paragraph 4 is consistent with the rest of 
Article 7.  
The U.S. view is that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 authorize the use of total profits 
methods independently of paragraph 4 of Article 7 of the OECD Model because total 
profits methods are acceptable methods for determining the arm’s length profits of 
affiliated enterprises under Article 9. Accordingly, it is understood that, under 
paragraph 2 of the Convention, it is permissible to use methods other than separate 
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accounting to estimate the arm’s length profits of a permanent establishment where it is 
necessary to do so for practical reasons, such as when the affairs of the permanent 
establishment are so closely bound up with those of the head office that it would be 
impossible to disentangle them on any strict basis of accounts.  
 
Sweden Feb. 23, 1983 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Switzerland Jan. 11, 1983 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Thailand Dec. 14, 1988 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Sept. 24, 
2003 
Art. 31 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Kingdom June 21, 1979 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam Oct. 26, 2005
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
SUDAN &   
United Arab 
Emirates 
Mar. 18, 
2001 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
SWEDEN &   
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Tanzania May 2, 1976 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Thailand Oct. 19, 1988
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Feb. 1984 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Tunisia May 7, 1981 
Art. 26 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Ukraine Aug. 14, 1995 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Venezuela Sept. 8, 1993 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam Mar. 24, 1994 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Zambia Mar. 18, 1974 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
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Zimbabwe Mar. 10, 1989 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
TAIWAN &   
Thailand July 9, 1999 
Art. 26 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam April 13, 1998 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
MONGOLIA &   
Poland April 18, 1997 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Singapore Oct. 10, 2002
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Switzerland Sept. 20, 1999 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Thailand Aug. 17, 2006 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Feb. 21, 
2001 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
32
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 83 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83
United Kingdom April 23, 1996 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Ukraine July 1, 2002 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Vietnam May 9, 1996 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
MAURITIUS &   
Oman Mar. 30, 1998 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Singapore Aug. 19, 1995 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Sweden April 23, 1992 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Zimbabwe Mar. 6, 1992 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
MALAYSIA &   
United Kingdom Dec. 10, 1996 
Art. 30 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
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Mauritius Aug. 23, 1992 
Art. 26 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Syria Feb. 26, 2007 
Art. 29 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Turkmenistan Nov. 19, 2008 
Art. 27 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Nov. 28, 
1995 
Art. 28 
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Yugoslavia April 24, 1990 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
KENYA & 
 
                 Thailand 
Dec. 26, 
2006 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed 
by such an apportionment as may be customary…” 
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